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Billig and Smith: Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Statutory Interpretation

BULK SALES LAWS: A STUDY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATIONT
THOMAS CIFFORD BILG*
KnGS=EY R. SMrm'*

This article is the second of a series which proposes to deal
with several aspects of bulk sales legislation. The first paper,
entitled "Bulk Sales Laws; A Study in Economic Adjustment"
appeared in the November, 1928 issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. That discussion considered three phases
of the bulk sales problem: (1) the inability of the American
statutory successors of 13 Elizabeth to meet the legal needs of
the creditor class when a defrauding merchant sold out in bulk
his stock of unpaid for goods to a bona fe purchaser for value;
(2) the campaign waged by the National Association of Credit
Men to place bulk sales laws on the statute books of the fortyeight states; (3) the unfavorable attitude of at least five state
supreme courts toward bulk sales laws which resulted (a) in these
statutes being declared unconstitutional in the states in question
and (b) in certain changes being made in the unconstitutional
statutes in order to meet the objections raised by the courts.
This paper proposes to take up the story where the earlier one
left off. It will consider, first, the reaction of certain outstanding
credit men of the present generation to these statutes, some of
which have been inforce in their respective states for more than
thirty years, and, second, the reaction of the courts in interpreting and applying certain provisions of these statutes. In other
words, just as the former article treated the past history of bulk
sales laws, so this one will consider the present status of such laws
from the viewpoint of both credit men and courts. Whatever
personal reactions the authors may have toward these laws and
the construction placed upon them, and whatever suggestions they
may have in the direction of statutory changes will be reserved
for a later paper. This later paper also will cover certain
phases of statutory interpretation not considered herein.
t The authors desire to express their appreciation to Melba Stucky Billig,
Esq. of the Pennsylvania Bar for her editorial criticism of this paper. They
wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to the several publications of W. Randolph Montgomery, Esq. of the New York Bar, counsel to the National Association of Credit Men, for many suggestions contained herein; also to the
various credit men who responded so generously to requests for information
and opinion.
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
** Student Editor, West Virginia Law Quarterly.
1 (1928) 77 U. PA. L. REv. 72.
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BULK SALES'LAWS
Even at the risk of repeating a part of the former article,
something should be said at the outset concerning the purpose of
a bulk sales law and the various forms which such a statute may
take. As already suggested, the bulk sales law was aimed at giving an unsecured, unpaid creditor of a merchant a remedy (in
addition to any remedy he possessed either at common law or
under such a statute as 13 Elizabeth) against a defendant who
had purchased in bulk the stock of the merchant without put2
ting the merchant's creditors on notice. In order to meet this
situation three general types of bulk sales statutes have been
evolved. (1) Thirty-three jurisdictions' have modelled their bulk
sales laws upon what has been described as the "New York
form".' (2) Twelve states' have fashioned their bulk sales en2For a description of the wide use of such practices, see ibid. 75-81.

A

discussion of the specific remedies open to creditors under bulk sales statutes
will be reserved until the future paper previously mentioned.
8ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §§ 8041-8045; AnN. Dia. STAT. (Supp.
(1927) §§ 4870-4872; COLO. Coup. LAWs (1922) §§ 3756-3758; DEL. REV.
CODE (1915) § 2638; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith & Hurd, 1929) 2566; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 8025-8054; IOWA CODE (1927) §§ 10008-10012; KAN.
REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 58, §§ 101-104; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 114,
§ 6; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) e.106, §§ 1, 2; 2 Mion. Coup. LAWS (Cahill,
1915) §§ 6346-6348; MiNN. GEN. STAT. (1923) §§ 8473-8474; MISS. CODE
(1930) §§ 3353-3356; MO. REV. STAT. (1919) §§ 2286-2290; NED. Coup. STAT.
(1922) 2561-2562; N. H. Pus. LAWS (1926) 840; N. J. COUP. STAT. (CuM.

Supp. 1924) §§ 180-182; N. M. STAT. (Courtright, 1929), c. 119, §§ 101-103;
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 42, §§ 44;.N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,

1927) § 1013; 1 N. D. Coup. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 7224-7227; OIO GEN.
CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 11, 102-11, 103-1; 2 OKLA. COUP. STAT. (1921) §§ 60276030; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) §§ 4503-4504; 3 S.C. CODE o LAWS (1922)

§§ 3527-3529; S. D. Coup. LAWS (1929) §§ 914-921; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917 §§ 3193al-3193a3; TEX. C02IPLETE STAT. (1928) §§ 4001-4003;
VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) §§ 6013-6014; VA. CODE (1930) § 5187; W. VA. REV.
CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 2, §§ 1-6; Wis. STAT. (1929) § 241.18-241.21; Wyo.
Coup. STAT. ANN. (1920)

c.

302.

' "This type of statute usually provides that the sale, transfer, or assignment in bulk of the whole or any part of a stock of merchandise, or (in the
event of a sale made outside of the ordinary course of trade) of such merchandise and fixtures used in the business-shall be void as against the creditors
of the seller or assignor unless certain conditions are complied with. These
(conditions) are that a detailed inventory of the stock and its cost price
must be made at least five days before the transfer; that the purchaser or
assignee must receive from the seller or assignor a sworn statement listing
his creditors and the anount owing each; and that the purchaser or assignee
must notify these creditors, either personally or by registered mail, at least
five days before the transfer, as to the price, terms, and conditions of the
proposed sale. Assignments for the benefit of creditors (ordinarily) are exempt from provisions of these statutes, as are sales by judicial and fiduciary
officers ..... Any purchaser or assignee who fails to conform to the requirements of the statute, upon the application of any creditor of the seller, becomes
latter
a receiver (or trustee) for the creditors and is held accountable to the Billig,
-for all merchandise and fixtures which have come into his hands."
op. cit. supra n. 1, at 72.
5D. C. ANN. CODE (Torbert, 1924) 325; FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927)
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311

actments after a type of statute called the "Pennsylvania form"'
(3) and four states follow a kind of statute which has been termed the "Connecticut form".
In the light of this classification it is of interest (since this
article is being published in West Virginia) to set out in part at
this point the West Virginia Statute, which in its general structure
follows the New York form.8
§ 1. When Sale in Bulk of Merchandise or Fxtures
Fraudulent and Void. - The sale in bulk of any part, or the
§§ 5772-5775; GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926 §§ 3226-3229; 2 IDAHO CohrP.
STAT. (1919) §§ 5752-5756; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 2651a-1-2651a-7;
Acts of La., 1926, 464; 2 MD. ANN. GODE- (Bagby, Supp. 1929) art. 83, 88 100104; Laws of Mont., 1931, §§ 8607-8610; NEV. REv. LAws (1912) § 3908;
2 ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920) §§ 8161-8164; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 784-791
as amended May 10, 1929, P. L. 1710; Laws of Utah, 1923, c. 92 §§ 1-6.
II The principal provisions of the New York form are included, although ten
days notice to creditors instead of five usually are required. In addition the
Pennsylvania form sets forth the form of certificate of indebtedness to which
the seller must make affidavit. If the act is not complied with the transaction
is 'fraudulent and void' rather than 'void'. The purchaser also is required
to see that the proceeds of the sale are applied to the debts of the seller.
A wilful false statement by the seller to the purchaser is made a misdemeanor.
The creditors of the vendor may waive the protection of the act, and a ninetyday limitation is imposed upon those who would take advantage of the
statute." Billig, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 73.
7See MONTIommy, LAws AND DEcIsIoNs APPLYING TO SALES IN BULK (2d
ed. 1926) 13.
The Connecticut bulk sales law (CONN. PuB. ACTS, 1931, c. 234, § 570a)
is quite limited in scope. Its provisions include only those vendors who are
engaged in the business of buying commodities and selling the same "in
Barber shops, dental
small quantities for the purpose of making a profit."
parlors, restaurants, shoe repair shops, and shoe-shining and hat-cleaning
establishments are mentioned specifically as within its requirements. The proposed transfer must be recorded "in the town clerk's office in the town where
such vendor conducts such business" at least fourteen days and not more
than thirty days before the sale, but no personal notice to the seller's creditors
is required. Arizona (Aniz. REV. CODE, Struckmeyer, 1928, § 2888); California
(CAL. Civ. CODE, Ragland, 1927, § 3440, and Washington (Wash. Comp. Stat.
Supp. 1927, §§ 5832-5836) all follow along general lines the Connecticut form,
although in all three states the operation of the statute is not limited to those
buying and selling commodities in small quantities only as in Connecticut.
As amended in 1926, the Washington statute also includes some provisions
similar to those found in the Pennsylvania statute.
9W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) C. 40, art. 2, §§ 1-6.
The original bulk sales statute of 1909 was held constitutional in Marlow
v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386 (1917). Lynch, J., who wrote the
opinion, said in part, at p. 571: "The necessity for legislation of this character
seems to be vindicated fully by the persistent efforts of state legislatures to
enact laws restricting sales of merchandise in bulk when not in the ordinary
course of trade, except upon compliance with certain conditions prescribed by
the various enactments. The earlier attempts to meet the real or preconceived
urgency that impelled resort to relief against tansactions of this character
failed to secure judicial approval. Frequently they were condemned as enactments beyond constitutional authorization or limitation express or implied.
The avoidances, however, were met finally and successfully by reenactments
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whole, of a stock of goods, wares and merchandise and / or
fixtures, pertaining to the conducting of the seller's business,
otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the
regular prosecution of the business of the seller, shall be
fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the seller, unless the seller and purchaser shall, at least fifteen days before
the sale, make a full detailed inventory, showing the quantity, and so far as possible with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, the cost price to the seller, of each article to be included in the sale and the price to be paid therefor; and unless the purchaser demand and receive from the seller a written list of the names and addresses of the creditors of the
seller, with the amount of indebtedness due or owing to each,
certified by the seller under oath to be a full, accurate and
complete list of his creditors, and of his indebtedness, or a
statement certified by the seller under oath that he has no
creditors; and unless the purchaser shall, at least fifteen days
before taking possession of such goods, wares and merchandise
and / or fixtures, or paying therefor or giving some note or
other evidence of indebtedness therefor, notify personally or
by registered mail every creditor whose name and address is
stated in such list, or of which he has knowledge, of the proposed sale and stating the aggregate value of the goods, wares
and merchandise and / or fixtures, proposed to be sold, as
shown by such inventory, and the price, terms and conditions
of such sale.'
deemed essential to avoid the judgment of organic condemnation pronounced
and enforced by the courts, or by eliminating provisions previously held invalid. So that generally these statutes now are upheld as entirely free from
constitutional interdiction, although the statutes of Ohio and some other states
have not yet obtained the sanction of their appellate courts."
o The Revisers' Note explains that "this section comprises that portion of
§ 3a, c.74 Code 1923 which constituted the whole of § 1, c. 78, Acts 1909
... The words 'or a statement certified by the seller under oath that he
has no creditors' are new, also the words 'or giving some note or other
evidence of indebtedness therefor,' taken from § 5187 Code Va. 1919.
The concluding portion of the section beginning with the words 'and
stating the aggregate value' adopted substantially from § 5187 Code Va. 1919
is new."
Section 2 of Article 2 provides that if the inventory or the list of creditors
furnished by the seller or the notice given by the buyer to the creditors "shall
in any respect be false or incomplete" with respect to the matters required by
Section 1, then "such sale shall prima facie be presumed to be fraudulent
and void as against the creditors of such seller, and the burden shall be upon
the purchaser to show that he acted in good faith and without any knowledge
of such falsity or incompleteness." This section appeared for the first time
in the Revised Code of 1931.
Section 3 provides that if the sale is invalid because of failure to comply
with the statute then "the goods, wares and merchandise and/or fixtures,
in the hands of the purchasers ..... shall be liable to such creditors." If
the purchaser has disposed of the goods then he shall be liable to the creditors
in an action at law for the value of the goods.
Section 4 requires the seller and the purchaser to preserve the inventory list
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The West Virginia Bulk Sales Law was first enacted in 1909,"
and - as already pointed out - it followed the general lines of
what has since become known as the "New York form". However it has been suggested that the statute was derived immediately from the Bulk Sales Law of Massachusetts, whose language it
follows." As originally framed, the period of notice to creditors
was five days instead of fifteen days. The phrase "and / or fixtures pertaining to the conducting of the seller's business" was
not included until the Amendment of 1921. This amendment followed the decision of Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran,' which
will be discussed presently. It was drafted by A. J. Barnett, Esq.,
at that time secretary of the Charleston Association of Credit
Men, and by Cameron C. Lewis of Lewis, Hubbard & Co. of
Charleston and it encountered no organized opposition on the
m
"
floor of the Legislature.
The Credit Man's Reaction to Bulk Sales Laws
In view of the fact that some writers have questioned the
justification of bulk sales statutes,' the authors of this paper felt
that it would be worth while to obtain opinions as to the usefulness of such legislation and constructive suggestions as to possifor six months. After the expiration of that period no suit can be brought
attacking the sale.
Section 5 declares that "sellers and purchasers ..... shall include corporations, associations, copartnerships and individuals, but nothing contained
in this article shall apply to sales by executors, administrators, receivers,
assignees under a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, trustees
in bankruptcy, or by any one acting under judicial process."
Section 6 sets out the form of notice which the purchaser is required to
furnish the seller's creditors.
10Acts of W. Va., 1909, c. 78 § 1.
"Our Bulk Sales Law is in identical language with the statute of the
State of Massachusetts upon the question, and was evidently taken from the
law of that state." Ritz, J., in Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W.
Va. 235, 237, 101 S.E. 465 (1919).

12Tbid.

15Letter to the authors, December 8, 1931, from Ira W. Belcher, SecretaryTreasurer, Charleston Association of Credit Men.
14Ibid.
"-'Such diversity of construction (as the courts have placed upon bulk
sales statutes) leads to the suspicion that there is little need for remedial
statutes of this nature. Before the Federal Bankruptcy Act there was
undoubtedly a serious evil. If an insolvent retail dealer could suddenly
and secretly sell his stock in bulk, not only was it difficult for his creditors to find out what had been done with the proceeds, but the debtor
could often make preferences which the remaining creditors were unable
to defeat (citing authorities). But the National Bankruptcy Act obviates
both these dangers, by providing for a speedy discovery of assets (§ 7,
a. 1 and a. 8) and making a preference by an insolvent debtor an act
of bankruptcy (§ 3, a. 2) and voidable (§ 60, a, b). Thus these statutes
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ble changes from some of the outstanding credit men of the United
States. It is as true now as it was in the early years of the twentieth century - the hey-day of bulk sales laws - that the credit
man is the person most vitally concerned with the situation which
a bulk sales statute seeks to cover. Thirty years ago the credit
men were the enthusiastic proponents of bulk sales laws."8 Consequently it is of interest to learn how they feel about those
statutes now - especially in view of the many changes made in
them through judicial interpretation and legislative enactment.
The secretaries of at least two West Virginia credit associations still believe, with reservations, in the efficacy of bulk sales
laws. Mr. Ira W. Belcher, secretary-treasurer of the Charleston
Association of Credit Men wrote us :"'
"This law is one of the most beneficial laws for the benefit of creditors selling retailers. It prevents, to a great
measure, the retailer colluding with some crooked person to
defraud those who grant credit. In the old days before we
had this law, if a creditor went to his debtor and demanded
payment, and the debtor desired to defraud the creditor, he
merely said to his creditor: 'I am no longer connected with
this business and am unable to pay you'. And thereupon
some relative or friend would produce an unrecorded bill of
sale from the debtor, and the creditor had no remedy. This
practice has been stopped."
Mr. U. R. Hoffman, secretary and manager of the Central
West Virginia Credit and Adjustment Bureau at Clarksburg, concurs in the opinion expressed by Mr. Belcher. Mr. Hoffman wrote,
"The law as it stands today has proven very efficient and appears
to be known by more business people than most of our laws"."
Both of these credit men, however, made definite criticisms of
the West Virginia Bulk Sales Statute and both suggested ways in
which it might be improved. Mr. Belcher believes that the law
should be broadened to cover other businesses than mercantile esare of little use except in cases where the seller is solvent at the time
of the sale, or where the purchaser acts bona flde and the seller
absconds . . . . ,. (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 717, 718.
"It would seem that the remarkable thing about this law is that it does
not get anywhere. If the law is violated, the creditor is simply relieved of
the burden of proving the sale to be void. If its mandates are obeyed, he
Hunt, The Bulk
gets a notice and may apply his remedy if he has any."
Sales Law (1916) 82 CENT. L. J. 246, 250.
18
Billig, op. cit. n. 1, at 81 et seq.
17 Letter of December 17, 1931.
"'Letter of December 22, 1931.
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tablishments - restaurants, for example.19 Mr. Hoffman raises
several questions in the following paragraphs from his letter.'
"The law .... is seldom complied with as written for
the reason that in order to comply with the law fully it would
be necessary to take an inventory of stock, fixtures and equipment and then close the place of business and cease operation
for a period of at least 15 days. This part of the law appears
to work a handicap on the sale of any business for the reason
that, if it is closed for a period of 15 days, in most cases
practically all of the trade would be gone and it would be
the same as opening a new venture.
"This feature is usually taken care of by taking an inventory, giving the necessary 15 days notice, and then by
placing the money derived from the sale in the hands of
a third disinterested party to be held in escrow for the benefit
of all creditors until such time as the expiration of the required notice when it is distributed, either paying 100 cents
on the dollar, or on a pro rata basis.
"Another question which often comes up and which has
not been fully settled is whether or not one would be complying with the act by paying one or two creditors the full
amount of the purchase price rather than distributing to all
creditors on a pro rata basis, presuming, of course, that none
has a preference by law.
"Still another question which often comes up is whether
or not the purchaser is paying an adequate price for the
goods and equipment which he is buying. However, in most
cases in which we are interested, this is taken care of by a
committee representing creditors, the members of which either
assist in the taking of the inventory or investigate the same
after it has been taken."
Several interesting letters were received from credit bureau
officials in the neighboring states of Ohio and Pennsylvania. Mr.
J. E. Fagan, Secretary of the Credit Association of Central Ohio,
with offices in Columbus, believes that the existence of bulk sales
legislation is a real help to the creditors of small business establishments which sometimes are transferred without any compliance whatsoever with the Statute.' The larger business establishment involves less of a problem, because in almost every instance
the parties consult an attorney and the bulk sales law is complied
with strictly.

10The reason for tlis suggestion will appear in the discussion which follows
later of Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, supra n. 11.
n Letter cited supra n. 18.
21 Letter to the authors, January 14, 1932.
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Mr. Fagan makes the same criticism of the Ohio Statute"
that Mr. Belcher made of the West Virginia Statute, namely, that
it is too limited in the type of business covered.
Although the
Ohio Bulk Sales Law now includes both merchandise and fixtures,
the Ohio Court of Appeals, in a test case carried up by the Columbus Association of Credit Men, ruled in 1928' that the language
of the statute was not broad enough to cover the fixtures of a
restaurant transferred without complying with its provisions."'
Mr. Hugh Wells, manager of the adjustment bureau of the
Cleveland Association of Credit Men, makes the following frank
comment on the Ohio Bulk Sales Law :'
"The Bulk Sales Act of the State of Ohio was placed upon the statute books by the credit men of Ohio. When it first
became a law it covered only merchandise, but it was later
amended to include furniture and fixtures. The law has effectively instilled into the hearts and minds of the crooks
the fear of punishment which might result from the fraudulent 'transfer of stocks of merchandise in bulk, and has resulted probably in stopping transfers of this nature. It has
thus probably protected the credit granting interests to the
extent of a large sum of money, but it has acted principally
as a sort of policeman who threatens dire trouble if sale are not
handled properly.
"As a fact, frankly, the statute in my opinion is somewhat of a failure. The creditor may within the five day period, attack the transfer by garnisheeing the money, or attaching the merchandise, or by asking for a receiver and that the
buyer be declared a trustee. The creditor who does not receive notice has, as you know, ninety days time from the date
of the sale within which to start a suit asking that the buyer
be declared a trustee ....
"The opinion of (some) lawyers is that the Act is a good
bit of a farce; cumbersome; not clearly defined as to rights
or remedies; ineffective, and the judges object to it as class
legislation. It often works severe hardship on the individual
party who buys in good faith, pays a fair consideration but
2 Onio GEN. CODE, supra n. 3.
2 Monypenny-Rammond Co. v. John Papanagnos and the Nims Realty Company, unreported.
I Mr. Fagan raises another interesting question in his letter: "I frequently
find that creditors are at a loss as to procedure when they do receive a notice
in compliance with the Bulk Sales Law, and quite often they call on us after
the five-day period has expired, asking what action they should take to protect
their rights. There seems to be a general lack of understanding as to their
rights when they are notified that a transfer of assets is about to take place,
and the creditor is in doubt as to the adequacy of the consideration."
' Letter to the authors, January 12, 1932.
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fails to comply strictly with the requirements of the Act and
is forced to endure a law suit, attorney fees and a possible
further obligation.
"The Bulk Sales Act could well at this time stand a further study and clarification by amendment for the benefit of
all concerned."
Mr. Paul A. Kerin, district manager of the Altoona, Pennsylvania, office of the Credit Association of Western Pennsylvania
believes that "the Bulk Sales Law has materially assisted credit
men generally in preventing debtors evading their just debts by
overnight transfers of their business". "In many instances of my
experience in this field of work we have increased returns to
creditors through the use of this law", Mr. Kerin wrote.'
General concurrence with the view that bulk sales statutes
are helpful to creditors was expressed by Mr. Thomas 0. Sheckell,
manager of the New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau.'
However, Mr. Sheckell believes that the five-day period of notice
provided for in the New York Statute (and in the West Virginia
Statute, as originally enacted) is not enough time for the creditors
to take the steps necessary to protect their interests.
The sale of a debtor's business directly to a purchaser - with
the Bulk Sales Law strictly adhered to - rather than a transfer
through the medium of an assignee for the benefit of creditors, is
a device for settling a debtor's estate which has found favor in
some of the adjustment bureaus affiliated with the National Association of Credit Men . ' Mr. Sheckell describes this process as

follows :,
"We are using the Bulk Sales Law more and more as a
means of carrying into effect an agreed settlement between
a debtor and his creditors. Creditors are called together and
they appoint a committee. The committee investigates the
condition of the debtor's affairs, usually by having an audit
and thorough analysis made of the business. They then agree
upon what is a fair and reasonable settlement net to the
creditors. And, assuming that the debtor was a corporation
which it so frequently is - and that a release is not an
important feature, they agree upon a bulk sale to be consumLetter to the authors, January 23, 1932.
- Letter to the authors, January 12, 1932.
See, for example, In re Dinger Electric Store, administered by the adjustment bureau of the Cleveland Association of Credit Men (1928), printed in
BILLIG & CAREY, CASES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF INSOLVENT ESTATES
(1932).
-"Letter cited supra n, 27.
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mated in five days, in compliance in every respect with the
Bulk Sales Law. We then distribute pro rata to the creditors
their share of the proceeds of the sale.
"In this manner the purchaser takes a good title to the
property, creditors have their five days to enjoin the sale if
they are not satisfied with the terms and the plan has a
tendency of forcing the settlement, in a sense, on the smaller
creditors who very frequently would assume an attitude of
placing a nuisance value on their small claims."
The Legal Interpretation of Bulk Sales Statutes
The foregoing section presented the views of a group of representative credit men as to the practical utility of bulk sales statutes.
If any summary of that section is possible, it might be phrased in
some such fashion as this - the credit men, as a class, believe in
the efficacy of bulk sales laws, but at the same time they realize
that at best these statutes are limited in their application, and that
in their. present form many of them still require considerable revision.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to considering
some of the problems which the credit men and others have raised
and to setting forth the reaction of the courts toward these problems.
Only one generalization, if any, can be drawn safely concerning the attitude of the judiciary toward bulk sales laws. That,
as Professor Vold points out in his recently published Handbook
of the Law of Sales,' is the fact that a majority of courts thus
far have favored strict interpretation of bulk sales statutes." But
even so there is a vigorous and growing minority' - which in one
'VoLD,

HANDBOOK OF LAW OF SALES

(1931) 408.

' The authorities are collected ibid. n. 21. In some nine cases including
Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, supra n. 11, the courts expressly avow a
strict interpretation of bulk sales stautes. In the latter case the Court said,
per Ritz, J., at 85 W. Va. 236: "In construing this statute we must bear
in mind that it is a restraint to alien property, and mus't not be extended
to include matters not embraced within its terms."
The case held that the
sale of a lunch wcgon, together with the fExtures and supplies, was valid as
to creditors of the seller although the seller had not complied with the Bulk
Sales Law of West Virginia as then framed. W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes,
1923) c. 74, § 3a. In fourteen other cases, including the leading case of
Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915), the
respective courts interpreted the statute strictly with little direct discussion
of the point.
2bid. n. 22. "Liberality of interpretation was avowed" in at least seven
cases. "Liberality of interpretation, at least with regard to certain items,
was exemplified without much direct discussion on the point" in four cases,
including Mariow v. Ringer, supra n. 8. In Marlow v. Ringer the Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the transfer by Ringer, a retail grocery merchant,
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instance at least included West Virginia - that advocates the
liberal construction of these laws. The reason for this difference of
position is not difficult to ascertain. On the one hand we have
the tendency shown by some courts to approach the problem of
the specific ease from the standpoint of the strong common law
position of the buyer. As a bulk sales statute is an attack on this
position, the court using the "common law approach" will be inclined to employ strict interpretation in order to preserve the common law scheme as far as possible. On the other hand the court
which favors a "commercial approach" to legal problems may
utilize liberal interpretation in order to extend the rights of the
defrauded creditors. However, it is all too easy to place a certain
court in a liberal category or in a conservative category, or to
-allege that it has a "common law approach" or a "commercial
approach". The real truth probably lies in the following statement by Professor Vold: "The arguments for strict or for liberal
interpretation may on occasion appeal to the court with greater
force in one type of case than it does in another, and examples of
strict and of liberal interpretation of such statutes under variant
facts may readily be found in the same jurisdiction". Certainly
this was the situation in West Virginia in the cases of Marlow v.
Ringer' and Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughramn both decided by
the Supreme Court of Appeals within a two-year period.
Bearing in mind, then, that judicial interpretation varies with
the jurisdiction in question, the .statute involved, and the circumstances of the specific case, certain major problems of construction
common to the several types of bulk sales laws will now be presented.
Creditors
First of all, just who are included within the term "creditors"
as it is employed in a bulk sales statute? In other words, whom
of a half interest in his business and stock of goods to Marlow, in consideration of Marlow's placing in the store a quantity of goods equal in value to
the stock then owned by Ringer (altho the parties intended to form a partnership to carry on the business at the same location) constituted a "sale of
merchandise in bulk," within the purview of the bulk sales law, "otherwise
than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution
of the seller's business," and, since the provisions of the bulk sales law had
not been complied with, the transfer was void in toto as against Ringer's
creditors.
1 Marlow v. Ringer, supra n. 8.
"ib .
Supra n. 11.
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does the law seek to protect? The construction usually placed on
the word "creditors" is that it includes a/l the creditors of the
seller irrespective of class and without regard for the fact that
they may or may not be merchandise creditors.' The creditor's
claim need not have been reduced to judgment.' Neither need it
have arisen out of a transaction involving the goods transferred."
The Supreme Court of Michigan in People's Savings Bank v. Van
Allsburgn summed up the law on the point in the following manner:
"Section 3 provides that if the purchaser does not comply with the provisions of the Act, upon application of any
of the creditors he shall become a receiver, etc., and the same
section further provides that if he shall conform to the provisions of the law he shall not be liable to any of the creditors
of the seller. If the legislature intended to restrict the notice
to any particular class of creditors, it did not so indicate by
The language made use of is clear and
the language used.
free from ambiguity, and no room is left for the contention
that the legislature intended to apply it to any particular
class of creditors."
The case contains numerous instances of this tendency to construe liberally the expression "creditors of the seller". In
another Michigan decision the obligee on an appeal bond was
held to be a creditor of the surety on the bond, even though the
bond had not become absolute through affirmance of the judgment
and the obligor's failure to pay. Consequently the obligee was
held to be entitled to notice under the Michigan Bulk Sales Law.
Other cases illustrating this approach are cited in the footnote."
6Prins v. American Trust Co., 169 Ark. 455, 275 S. W. 914 (1925);
Rabalsky v. Levenson, 221 Mass. 289, 109 N. E. 1050 (1915) ; Peoples' Savings
Bank v. Van Allsburg, 165 Mich. 524, 131 N. W. 101 (1911); Joplin Supply
Co. v. Smith, 182 Mo. App. 212, 167 S. W. 649 (1914); Touris v. Karantzalis,
170 App. Div. 42, 156 N. Y. Supp. 526 (1915); Leon Hersch Corp. v. Goldberg, 126 Mike. 857, 214 N. Y. Supp. 389 (1926); Gardner v. Goodner Wholesale Co., 247 S. W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
The Bulk Sales Law applies only to claims arising ex contractu, and not to
unliquidated claims ex delicto such as a claim for damages for a personal
injury. Harrison v. Riddell, 64 Mont. 466, 210 Pac. 460 (1922).
"'Scheve v. Vanderkolk, 97 Neb. 204, 149 N. W. 401 (1914).
1Prins v. American Trust Co., supra n. 36; Pennell v. Robinson, 164 N. C.
257, 80 S. E. 417 (1913).
19upra
n. 1.
10 Hanna v. Hurley, 162 Mich. 601, 127 N. W. 710 (1910).
41Galbraith v. Okla. State Bank, 36 Okla. 807, 130 Pac. 541 (1912); Mahoney-Jones Co. v. Sams, 128 Tenn. 207, 159 S. W. 1094 (1913); Eklund v.
Hopkins, 36 Wash. 179, 78 Pae. 787 (1904). Cf. with Mahoney-Jones Co. v.
Sams the case of Whitehouse v. Nelson, 43 Wash. 174, 86 Pac. 174 (1906).
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A few decisions were found which limit rather than expand
The Oklahoma case of
the meaning of the word "creditors".
One King,
an
illustration.
is
Co."
Drug
Huston v. Alexander
sold
a stock of
of
$623.45,
sum
in
the
while indebted to the plaintiff
drugs in bulk to Woody on May 6, 1912. Woody transferred the
stock of goods to defendant, Hston, on June 14, 1912. Both transfers were made without complying with the bulk sales statute.'
The plaintiff brought suit against King and attached the goods in
the hands of Huston. The trial court held both transfers void
under the statute and sustained the attachment. In reversing the
judgment, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma observed, per Hardy,

3.:-

"It appears from the evidence that Woody gave Huston
a written bill of sale, in which he recited that there was no
indebtedness against the property, and there was other
evidence upon this issue. The court found, however, that
Huston had knowledge of the claim of plaintiff. Conceding
258 Okla. 236, 158 Pac. 892 (1916). Accord: Markarian v. Whitmarsh, 78
N. H. 1, 95 AUt. 788 (1915) wherein the court said: "Though the word
'void' is used in the statute, in legal effect it moans voidable at the instance
of an attaching creditor".
"The Statute provided: "The transfer of any portion of a stock of goods,
wares or merchandise otherwise thain in the ordinary course of trade, in
the regular and usual prosecution of the transferer's business, or the
transfer of an entire such stock in bulk shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of such transferer."
"Huston v. Alexander Drug Co., supra n. 42, at 58 Okla. 238, 239.
As a result of the decision in Huston v. Alexander Drug Co., the Olahoma
Statute, 2 OKLA. Coup. STAT. (1921) §§ 6027-6030, was amended to read as
follows: "The transfer of any portion of a stock of goods, wares and merchandise, pertaining to the conducting of said business, otherwise than
in ordinary course of trade in the regular and usual prosecution of the
transferrer's business, or the transfer of an entire such stock in bulk,
shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of
such transferrer, and such presumption may be rebutted only by the
proposed transferee showing that, at least ten days before the transfer, and in good faith, he made a full and explicit inquiry of his transferrer, and of all antecedent transferrers in sales made within ninety
days prior thereto, as to the names and addresses of each and all of his,
or their creditors, and that he demanded and received from such transferrer or transferrers, at least ten days before such transfer, a list of
the names and addresses of all the creditors of said transferrer or transferrers, showing the amount owing each, which statement must be sworn
to by such transferrer, or transferrers, and the oath shall include a
declaration that it is a correct list of all of his or their, creditors, with
the post office address and the amount owing each; and that, at least
ten days before the transfer, the transferee notified or caused to be
notified, of such proposed transfer, personally, or by registered mail,
each of the creditors of such transferrer, or transferrers, of whom such
transferee had knowledge, or could with the exercise of reasonable diligence, acquire knowledge; and that such purchase was made by him in
good faith, for a fair consideration actually paid."
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that he did have such knowledge, it would not make the bulk
sales law applicable, for if the conveyance from Woody to
Huston be void under the law, then a third and fourth conveyance would likewise be void, and any transfer of the stock,
not matter how remote in point of time or numbers, would
be void so long as plaintiff had a valid claim against its
original debtor. We do not think the law should be so construed. It is not the province of the court to legislate, and
the language of the act indicates that such transfer is only
void as against the creditors of the transferor. The plaintiff
was a creditor of King, and not of Woody or of Huston, and
the transaction between Woody and Huston would be governed by the general rules of law respecting fraudulent conveyances. "'
Probably the most difficult problem concerning the creditors
arises in the case where the'name of one or more creditors is omitted from the list which the seller furnishes the buyer. It often
happens that this list is the buyer's only means of knowing the
persons to whom the seller in indebted. Consequently the creditor
whose name is missing often learns nothing of the transfer until
it has been completed, although the buyer may have made an
honest effort to notify all of the seller's creditors of whose existence he was aware."6 Whether the omitted creditor can regard the
transfer as "void" as to him (although valid as to the creditors
who have been notified) is a question on which there is some difference of opinion. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Coach v.
Gage7" held that, although the seller failed to include one of his
creditors (either intentionally or accidentally) on the list furnished the buyer, nevertheless the omitted creditor could not have
the sale set aside if the buyer had acted in good faith and had complied with the statute by notifying all the creditors whose names
appeared on the seller's statement. This decision probably states
""Such statutes do not apply in favor of subsequent creditors whose
claims have been incurred after the bulk sale in question, nor in favor of
creditors whose claims are barred by the statute of limitations". VoL, op.
cit. supra n. 30, at 413, citing Faeth Co. v. Bressie, 125 Kan. 425, 264 Pac.
1077 (1928); Kimball v. Cash, 107 Misc. 363, 176 N. Y. Supp. 541 (1919);
Fisher v. Woodward, 103 Neb. 253, 170 N. W. 907 (1919).
The West Virginia Statute, supra n. 3, requires the buyer to notify not
only all the creditors whose names appear on the list furnished him by the
seller, but also all creditors of whom he has knowledge. This provision may
enable the court to avoid the result reached in such decisions as Glantz v.
Gardiner, 40 R. I. 297, 100 At. 913 (1917), but it obviously does not provide
for the creditor of whose existence the buyer has no knowledge whatever. See
Thompson v. Shaw Motor Co., 128 S.C. 171, 122 S.E. 669 (1924).
" 70 Ore. 182, 138 Pac. 847 (1914).
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On the other hand there are some cases
the prevailing view.'
which favor the omitted creditor." but only one square holding
was found in which an omitted creditor was permitted to prevail
over a purchaser who had complied literally with the statute and
who had acted in entire good faith.
Sellers
In the second place, who are "sellers" within the meaning
of the bulk sales laws? The West Virginia statute,' which is typical, provides that "the sale in bulk of any part, or the whole, of
a stock of goods, wares and merchandise and / or fixtures pertaining to the seller's business otherwise than in the ordinary course
of trade and in the regular prosecution of the business of the
seller shall be fraudulent and void, ect." Only one West Virginia
case was found, Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran,n which placed
any judicial interpretation upon the types of business included
within the terms of the foregoing statute. That decision - which
will be discussed presently - held that the business of operating
a lunch wagon did not come within the purview of the Bulk Sales
Law.
The decisions in other jurisdictions reveal various reactions
as to who are "sellers" within the meaning of these statutes. In
Illinois - where the statute readsP "the major part or the whole
of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise and fixtures or other
goods and chattels of the vendor's business otherwise than in the
ordinary course of trade" - the courts have held that bulk sales
made by farmers were included;" and a sale of all its property
"9Accord: Swafford v. Ketchum, 177 Ark. 1152, 9 S.W. (2d) 806 (1928) ;
M Kelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S. W. 827
(1920); International Silver Co. v. Hull, 140 Ga. 10, 78 S. E. 609 (1913);
Glantz v. Gardiner, supra n. 46; Brecht Co. v. Robinowitz, 275 S. W. 213
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) and Note (1926) 4 TEX. L. RLrv. 260.
'Linn County Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pae. 972 (1918); Lindstrom v. Spicher, 53 N. D. 195, 205 N. W. 231 (1925); Oregon Mill & Grain
Co. v. Hyde, 87 Ore. 163, 169 Pae. 791 (1918); Ritter v. Ray, 45 Pa. Sup.

440 (1910).

wWalton v. Walton Fisher Co., 146 Miss. 291, 111 So. 364 (1927). The
only ease found which approximated this situation was Wilson v. Edwards,
32 Pa. Sup. Ct. 295 (1907). In that ease an omitted creditor was allowed to
levy on goods in the hands of a purchaser in bulk. But whether the purchaser notified the other creditors (if there were others) is not brought out
in the report of the ease.
"ISupran. 3.
2 Supra n.11.
3ILL. REV. STAT., supra n. 3, 2566.
199, 123 N. E. 314 (1919); Hall v.
"Weskainies v. Hesterman, 288 Ill.
Main, 34 F. (2d) 528 (D. C., E. D. Ill. 1929). But see Spur v. Travis, 145
Mich. 721, 108 N.-W. 1090 (1906).
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made by an opera house company, the property consisting of its
lease, furniture, fixtures, equipment and good will was held within
the purview of the statute.' Also, in at least two jurisdictions, '
transfers in bulk by wholesalers, as well as retailers, have been held
to fall within the provisions of the bulk sales laws.
On the other hand, these statutes in some jurisdictions have
been held inapplicable to a sale in bulk by a manufacturer of his
manufactured product, ' to the sale of the machinery, other equipment and supplies of a shoe repairing shop, ' to a like sale of the
equipment of a pool and billiard parlor, ' to the sale in bulk of the
fixtures and supplies of a restaurant.' Likewise a sale in bulk of
an automobile repair shop has been held not within the purview
of the statute.' Similar holdings have been found in the case of
hotels' and livery stables. ' And sales by auctioneers at public
auction have been held not to be within the statutes."
194, 124
6LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 Ill.
N. E. 454 (1919).
rONorth American Prov. Co. v. Fischer Lime Co., 168 Ark. 106, 269 S.
W. 993 (1925); Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S. W. 26
(1926); Niklaus v. Lessen-hop, 99 Neb. 803, 157 N. W. 1019 (1916). In
North American Prov. Co. v. Fisher Lime Co., the court said at p. 112:
"Now it will be seen that the language of the act in its common and
usual acceptation includes wholesale and retail merchants alike. The
language is sufficiently comprehensive to show that the object of the act
was not only to protect wholesale merchants against fraudulent sales
by retail merchants, but also to protect manufacturers and Nvholesale
merchants against fraudulent sales by wholesale merchants".
8'
Conn. Steam Brown Stone Co. v. Lewis, 86 Conn. 386, 85 Atl. 534 (1912);
Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S. E. 257 (1909); Gitt v.
Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 AtI. 585 (1930); Nichols, North Buse Co. v. Belgium
Cannery, 188 Wis. 115, 205 N. W. 804 (1925).
Swanson v. Devine, 49 Utah 1, 160 Pac. 872 (1916).
"Independent Breweries Co. v. Lawton, 200 Mo. App. 238, 204 S.W. 730
(1918); Ferrat v. Adamson, 53 Mont. 172, 163 Pac. 112 (1917).
0D. C. Goff Co. v. First State Bank of De Queen, 175 Ark. 158, 298 S.W.
884 (1927); Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N. D. 116, 155 N. W. 683 (1915); Swift
& Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N. C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919); Lewis Hubbard & Co.
v. Loughran, supra n. 11. See Annotation, Applicability of Bulk Sales Act
to Hotel, Restaurant, Boarding House, Saloon, Pool Hall, or Livery Stable,
(1920) 7 A. L. R. 1537, (1928) 54 A. L. R. 1537.
'Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson Auto Co., 168 Ark. 418, 270 S. W. 605
(1925).
"Stewart v. Sulger, 174 App. Div. 838, 161 N. Y. Supp. 489 (1916).
Everett Produce Co. v. Smith Bros., 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905 (1905);
Balter C. Miller v. Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S. W. 506 (1918).
"Schwartz v. King Realty Co., 93 N. J. L. 111, 107 Atl. 154 (1919);
aff'd., 94 N. J.L. 134, 109 At. 567 (1920). The bulk sales statutes of Kenfucky and Pennsylvania include specifically sales by auctioneers. The Illinois
statute excludes sales by auctioneers when made in good faith after proper
notice of the sale has been given by publication or posting.
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Property
In the third place to what property does a bulk sales law apply? How strictly is the phrase "a stock of goods, wares and
merchandise" interpreted? Does it, for instance, include the fixtures of the business in those states where the statute contains no
express reference to fixtures? On this question there has been
considerable disagreement. Some decisions have held that fixtures
were included by implication in the phrase "a stock of goods,
wares and merchandise". Other cases have reached an opposite
result."
West Virginia took the latter view in Lewis, Hubbard & Co.
v. Loughrane previously mentioned. In 1919, when this case was
decided, the statute' provided that "the sale in bulk of any part
of the whole of a stock of merchandise otherwise than in the
ordinary course of trade . . . . shall be fraudulent and void as
against the creditors of the seller." In the Loughran case the
owner of a lunch wagon in Charleston, while indebted to the plainfiff for supplies, sold the wagon, furniture, fixtures, appliances and
stock of supplies to one Reilley for $1000 cash. The sale occurred
on July 27, 1918 and about a month later the plaintiff sued the
seller in the Intermediate Court of Kanawha County and attached
the lunch wagon and its equipment in Reilley's possession. Reilley
petitioned for the release of the property from the attachment.
Plaintiff defended on the ground that the sale was void as to him,
a creditor, because of the seller's failure to comply with the requirements of the Bulk Sales Law. The Intermediate Court held
the transfer within the statute and ordered a sale of the property
in order to satisfy plaintiff's claim. The Circuit Court of Kanawha
County reversed the judgment and was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Appeals. After reviewing the authorities, Ritz, J. said
in the final paragraph of the court's opinion :'
Act?

"What was the purpose of the Legislature in passing this
Evidently to preserve for those engaged in the whole-

c Parham & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S. B. 460
(1907); Walton v. Walton Fisher Co., supra n. 50.
See, for example, Heilmann v. Powelson, 101 Misc. 230, 167 N. Y. Supp.
662 (1917). Smith v. Boyer, 119 S. C. 176, 112 S. E. 71 (1921). As to the
unsuccessful attempt of the Tennessee Legislature to amend the Bulk Sales
Law to include fixtures, see Henderson Co. v. Breeden Bros., 148 Tenn. 278,
2557 S.W. 359 (1923).
1 Supra n. 11.

08W. VA. CODE Axx. (Barnes, 1931) c 74, § 3a.

OD85 W. Va. 240.
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sale mercantile business, as security for the payment of their
debts for merchandise, the merchandise itself, unless the same
was sold in the ordinary course of trade. The language 'stock
of merchandise, or any part thereof,' was never intended to
include the furniture, fixtures and appliances necessarily employed in the conduct of the business, for the very good reason that they are not sold by such merchants in the ordinary
course of their business at all, and by its terms the act only
applies to such merchandise as is sold in the ordinary and
usual conduct of the business. One running a lunch wagon, as
was the defendant in this case, cannot be said to keep any
stock of merchandise at all for sale. His business is not buying and selling merchandise within the meaning of this Act,
and we are persuaded that it was never the legislative intent
that it should apply to a business of this character."
In 1921 the West Virginia Legislature amended the Bulk
Sales Law in such a manner as to give a creditor- further protection than the court was inclined to accord him in Lewis, Hubbard
& Co. v. Loughran. To the phrase "stock of goods, wares and
merchandise" was added "and for fixtures pertaining to the conducting of the seller's business".' Thus the word "fixtures" became part of the statute. But just wltat are "fixtures"?
The courts in several other jurisdictions have ruled on the
question. It has been held in Michigan, for instance, in the leading case of Bowen v. Quigley' that the "fixtures" of a coal business do not include horses, wagons, harness, coal bags and coal
chutes. And in the same jurisdiction the vehicles, harness, caskets
and appliances of an undertaker were declared not to be "fixtures" 2 On the other hand, "in Washington and Georgia, where
the statutes do not specifically cover fixtures, nevertheless the merchandise and 'fixtures' (including pool tables and the like) of a
saloon were held to be within the Bulk Sales Laws." '
The Michigan Court in Bowen v. Quigley" formulated the following definition of "fixtures":
"Inasmuch as this law is aimed at the business of merchants, we think the word 'fixtures' as used in the statute,
must have reference to such chattels as merchants usually
possess and annex to the premises occupied by them, to enable
Acts of W. Va., 1921, c. 108.
-165 Mich. 337, 130 N. W. 690 (1911).
People's Savings Bank v. Van Allsburg, upra n.36.
Montgomery, op. cit. supra n. 7, at 28, citing Parham v. Potts-Thompson
Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S. E. 460 (1907); Seattle Brewing Co. v. Donofris, 34
Wash. 18, 74 Pac. 823 (1904).
" Supra n. 71, at 339.
70
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them the better to store, handle and display their goods and
wares. Such chattels when annexed to the premises become
fixtures. They are generally removed without material injury
to the premises at or before the end of the tenancy. They are
sometimes called trade fixtures.
And, in explaining why it did not expand the term "fixtures" to
include the horses, wagons, coal bags, etc., the Court added:'
"It is suggested that by reason of the words 'pertaining
to the conducting of said business' the statute should be given
a broader meaning than it otherwise would be given, and be
made to include the furniture, tools, vehicles and appliances
which were used in and about the conducting of the coal business. We are not persuaded that the legislature has indicated
by the language made use of that it intended the word 'fixtures' should have any other or different meaning than is
usually given to it in the relation of landlord and tennant.
It is probably true that the act could be made more effective
if we were to give the word 'fixtures' the enlarged meaning
claimed for it, but we do not feel that the language of the
statute will justify us in so doing. If the legislature has stopped short of making it an effectice act, it is not the business
of this court to furnish the legislation by construction".
In 1921 the Virginia Legislature took steps to make their
bulk sales law a more "effective Act" by adding not only "fixtares" but also "other trade assets" to the phrase "any part or
the whole of a stock of merchandise"."8 It was the purpose of
this Amendment to cover such a situation as that arising in Bowen
v. Quigley. However, the "effective" measure was short lived.
It was struck out of the statute by another amendment in 1930.
So much, then, concerning what constitutes "fixtures", and
the rather unsettled state of the authorities. How broad is the
general phrase "goods, wares, and merchandise" apart from the
question of fixtures, if any such departure can be made? Some
courts, in their attempt to generalize, say that the phrase means
"goods and merchandise employed in trade, which in the ordinary
course of trade, and in the regular and usual prosecution of the
seller's business, would be sold or bartered otherwise than by a
sale in bulk".' Consequently it has been held that the following articles were not in the protected category of "goods, wares,
70VA. CODE ANN.

(1919) § 5187 as amended by Laws of 1926.
'Rice, J., in Wilson v. Edwards, .pra n. 50 at 302. Similar expressions
are found in People's Savings Bank v. Van Allsburg, supra n. 36 and in
Smith v. Boyer, smpra n. 66.
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and merchandise": a cash register used in a saloon which dispensed liquors and cigars;' the spare parts found in an automobile repair shop;" the food, utensils, and equipment in
a restaurant;$ two boats, a barge, rock crushers, and piles of rock
employed in construction work.' But, to the contrary, in an
Illinois case" the broad Bulk Sales Law of that jurisdiction' was
applied to the transfer of the cattle, horses, and tools used by a
dairyman who sold milk at retail.
Conoem
The factors just discussed under the divisions of creditors,
sellers, and property constitute some of the more important problems encountered in the operation of bulk sales laws. Others exist which will be presented and discussed in a later article, as, for
example, (1) what transactions (chattel mortgages, assignments
for the benefit of creditors, etc.) fall within the scope of bulk sales
statutes; (2) what is the meaning of the phrase "presumed to be
frauduleit and void" when used in a bulk sales law; (3) what
remedies are open to the creditors where the debtor sells out in
bulk without complying with the terms of the statute ?
As suggested at the beginning of this paper, it was not intended to incorporate herein the authors' conclusions regarding
any of the statutory problems growing out of bulk sales legislation. These conclusions will be reserved until the additional aspects of bulk sales laws noted above have been considered in the
next article of the series.
78Albrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 628 (1905).
7Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson Auto Co., supra n. 61.
'Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N. D. 116, 155 N. W. 683 (1915); Swift & Co. v.
Tempelos, supra n. 60.
"Atlas Rock Co. v. Miami Supply Co., 89 Mla. 340, 103 So. 615 (1915).
"Larson v. Judd, 200 I1. App. 420 (1916).
3ILL. REv. STAT., supra n. 3, renders fraudulent and void "the sale, transfer, or assignment in bulk of the major part or the whole of a stock of
merchandise, or merchandise and flixtures or other goods and chattels of the
vendor's business otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in
the regular and usual prosecution of the vendor's business."
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